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In his thoughtful commentary (Bartlett 1993) on my effort (Sanchez 1993) to
outline a theory of strategic management derived from the basic insights of options
theory, Christopher Bartlett expressed some substantive concerns about the
feasibility and desirability of approaching strategic management as a process of
optimizing strategic options. Of the several issues he raised, the most fundamental
are his concerns (1) about the potentially debilitating effects on an organization's
strategic independence and capacity for learning of using networks and markets to
source important resources and capabilities and (2) about the vital role of strategic
organizational commitment and its possible incompatibility with strategies based on
creating and maintaining strategic options. These concerns have also been expressed
to me by other strategy thinkers, and therefore in the comments below I try to make
clear what I believe are (and are not) the implications for strategic independence,
organizational learning, and commitment of an options approach to strategic
management.
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STRATEGIC INDEPENDENCE AND ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING
A concern often raised when one suggests that a firm can gain significant
strategic flexibility by using networks and markets to source important resources
and capabilities, is that a firm pursuing such a strategy may eventually suffer a
"long-term loss of strategic independence and organizational learning capacity"
(Bartlett 1993, p. 294).
I will take a strong position regarding the first concern and maintain that
strategic independence is illusory and unattainable in dynamic product markets.
Instead, strategic interdependence is the salient feature of successful firms in
dynamic markets, for the simple reason that no single firm can reasonably expect to
internalize all the resources and capabilities that might be needed to survive in the
long run in dynamic markets. Therefore, the only way a firm can hope to have access
to the array of resources and capabilities it might need in the future is to develop
skills in accessing resources and capabilities external to the firm, either through
networks or market sources of supply.
Certainly one can readily think of examples of firms that have not wisely or
skillfully managed their network and market supply arrangements -- and that as a
result have lost access to critical inputs or found themselves at the mercy of an
opportunistic supplier. The failures of some firms to maintain critical sources of
supply, however, ought not to be construed as a failure of strategic interdependence
per se as a viable means of sourcing critical inputs; rather, they should be taken as
examples for further study to determine why those firms failed to recognize,
establish, or maintain mutually beneficial incentive structures which would assure
the continuing cooperation of their suppliers. While such examples do not refute the
strategic usefulness of outsourcing or cure the inevitability of interdependence in
dynamic markets, they can serve a useful purpose by highlighting the need for
managers to be mindful of the long-term strategic options that may be created or
foreclosed through effective or ineffective management of supplier relationships.
As to the second concern that the learning capacity of the the firm as an
organization may be diminished by outsourcing important resources and
capabilities, I suggest that it is important to recognize that the possible diminution
of intra-organizational learning capacity which may follow when a firm outsources a
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particular activity may be compensated by the increased opportunities the firm
acquires thereby for inter-organizational learning. The learning which the firm
achieves through creating and exercising its strategic options to provide products
and services can enhance not only the core competencies and other capabilities of
the firm, but also those of its network partners and even its market suppliers. Thus,
to the extent that a firm is capable of being both a good learner and a good teacher,
as well as potentially a creator of new knowledge, the firm may be able to create a
dynamic incentive structure that rewards continuing cooperation by suppliers,
customers, and other allies.
Especially in outsourcing components and technologies through network
relationships, mutual interorganizational learning seems to be the essential currency
of transaction without which network relationships are unlikely to last or remain
productive of strategic options. Since a significant level of outsourcing is an
inevitability in dynamic markets, a firm's strategic managers must demonstrate skill
in promoting inter-organizational, mutually beneficial learning as an essential
counterpart to intra-organizational learning and as the cornerstone of network and
supplier relationships that expand the base of resources and capabilities (and thus
the strategic options) available to the firm.
To become strategically flexible, a firm will not only have to develop
interorganizational learning capabilities; it will also have to learn to be quick to
re-configure its own internalized capabilities and processes and its linkages to other
firms in order to respond advantageously to the rapidly changing circumstances of
dynamic markets. This model of the firm as a strategically flexible and nimble
organization raises the concern that the options perspective underestimates the
"administrative complexities involved in developing and exploiting resources and
capabilities," particularly the "development and management of complex linkages
of various assets and resources through organizational routines that are particular to
the specific application" (Bartlett 1993, p. 296).
I suggest that such concerns, in turn, implicitly raise the question of whether
complex administrative routines and idiosyncratic linkages are universal,
immutable mechanisms that characterize the way all organizations function. If so,
the universality and immutability of such organizational mechanisms would argue
persuasively against a normative theory of strategy in which the flexible and nimble
firm plays the central role. If we look at markets which have suddenly become much
more dynamic, we can find ample evidence that the formation of complex,
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idiosyncratic routines is a strong tendency in organizations. We can observe many
outright failures and many firms in great difficulty as they struggle to re-configure
themselves to be more flexible and nimble in responding to rapidly changing
circumstances. Witness, for example, the recent problems of IBM, DEC, and Apple
in responding to rapid changes in their respective computer markets. But we can
also observe that some firms are learning how to be more responsive to
unpredictable change by simplifying their administrative routines and streamlining
their internal and external linkages. Of especial interest is the appearance of many
new firms that seem to be a distinct new type of organization, a de novo kind of
"virtual" or "modular" firm. These new firms seem to be intentionally organized
around simplified, streamlined procedures and standardized "quick connect"
interfaces with other firms for the explicit purpose of improving the firm's ability to
adapt rapidly to rapid and unpredictable changes in its environment.
On further inspection, we would find that these new kinds of firms (and the
survivors among the newly restructured firms, as well) have come to rely on
networks and markets for many resources and capabilities which they previously
internalized -- and that as a result they are able to focus more effectively on
developing the core competencies that give them the greatest leverage in creating
and exercising strategic options. We would also observe that internalizing only the
core, options-rich resources and capabilities has enabled such firms (1) to create
more direct and effective linkages within their reduced set of internalized resources
and capabilities; (2) to develop new capabilities in leveraging the firm's core
competencies by quickly coupling the firm's core competencies with
complementary resources and capabilities from networks and markets; and (3) to
devise and institutionalize higher-order organizational structures and processes
capable of quickly adapting a smaller (and therefore more manageable) set of core
resources and capabilities to the changing requirements of a dynamic environment.
In other words, what we are tempted to conclude from studying dynamic
markets is not that organizations must always function in immutably complex (and
dynamically inefficient!) ways, but rather that organizations can evolve into new
forms that can move more quickly and effectively to create and exploit strategic
options. Of course, the evolution of increasingly flexible organizations changes the
nature of the competitive environment such firms face. Thus, in dynamic markets
we can readily see a spiraling co-evolution of organizational forms and competitive
environments towards increasingly greater organizational capabilities for flexibility
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and, as a result, towards increasingly more intense competitive demands for
organizational flexibility placed on firms that would compete in dynamic markets.
Undeniably, some firms have been unable to break free from the administrative
complexities and idiosyncracies that restrict their strategic flexibility. But by
skillfully cultivating strategic interdependence instead of pursuing an unattainable
goal of strategic independence, by exploiting inter-organizational learning
opportunities in place of pursuing exclusively intra-organizational learning, and by
experimenting with new organizational structures and processes that promise
flexibility and speed in responding to change, some new organizations appear to be
fully capable of creating and sustaining higher order organizational dynamics that
let the firm continually re-define and re-configure itself. If at least some
organizations can fundamentally change the way they function in an effort to reap
the benefits of being strategically flexibile in a dynamic environment, we should be
careful to let our ideas about how organizations might function change accordingly.
STRATEGIC COMMITMENT
I have suggested that in dynamic markets, the central task of strategic managers is
managing the process of identifying, creating, and exercising the firm's most
advantageous set of strategic options (Sanchez 1993). This view of the central task of
strategic managers has raised a number of concerns about the kind of organizational
culture that would result when a firm's senior managers take this view of their
primary management responsibility. For example, there is concern that "applying a
financial concept to a largely human process" reduces the human processes
involved in identifying, creating, and exercising strategic options to a "mechanical,
transaction-based perspective" (Bartlett 1993, p. 296) . There is also concern that a
strategy that relies extensively on external resources and capabilities or that may
defer important resource commitments or make them contingent on favorable
future outcomes can create an environment in which "the front lines of the
organization become demotivated ...[when] their ideas or proposals are either
shelved or shopped around, while their projects limp along in a netherworld of
semicommitment, waiting for market trends to become clear" (Bartlett 1993, p. 297).
This expected undesirable state of affairs may even be contrasted with the "much
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clearer vision of organizational purpose and strategic objectives" that characterize
"high-commitment organizations" like WalMart, Honda, or Sony, which are said to
have benefited from "the power of a management approach that leads the company
to make major resource commitments which often could not be justified by any
rational analysis of the firm's strategic position or capabilities" (Bartlett 1993, p. 297).
As for the first concern, there is always legitimate basis for concern that
techniques of financial valuation may be applied too zealously or narrowly,
especially when important (usually human) variables are excluded from
consideration because they cannot be assigned precise financial values. I would
suggest, however, that organizations that make appropriate efforts to assess the
economic value of the various options they might create do not thereby demean or
dehumanize the human beings or processes that must create those options. On the
contrary, my experience has often been that managers and front-line staff who
understand the irreducible uncertainty inherent in dynamic markets seem quite
naturally and intuitively to understand the economic and strategic value of creating
options for an uncertain future — and the need to assess the relative value (in a
comprehensive sense) of the various options the firm might create.
Further, if a firm elects to rely on external suppliers of resources or capabilities,
or if internally generated ideas are "shopped around" or held in abeyance until
circumstances are more favorable, it is undeniable that demotivation of staff may
occur if the firm's employees have not clearly understood that flexibility in sourcing
inputs and careful timing in exercising options are central to a strategy of strategic
flexibility ~ and that such a strategy offers the firm and its employees their best
chance of survival and success in dynamic markets. Thus, a key task of strategic
managers is to continually focus the attention of all firm members on the core
processes that are the source of the firm's distinctive competencies, so that all
employees can see beyond the inevitable vagaries of product-level decisions to the
underlying continuity of the firm's strategy of flexibility and to the processes and
capabilities that create the firm's strategic flexibility.
As for the second set of related concerns derived from the view that strategic
flexibility is incompatible with strategic commitment, I will conclude this
commentary by calling into question two notions that typically seem to underlie
such concerns: first, the notion that commitment per se in any sense constitutes a
strategy, and second, the notion that a strategy intent upon creating strategic
flexibility is antithetical to and incompatible with strategic organizational
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commitment.
Both for the sake of a lively discussion and because I think it happens to be
accurate, I will offer the opinion that the act of organizational commitment has been
and continues to be greatly overemphasized in the strategy literature, typically in a
form of theoretical myopia that looks only at the last and most visible step in what is
typically a long, multi-step strategic process leading up to the act of commitment. A
narrow focus on the act of commitment and the successes that (sometimes) follow
commitment runs the risk of ignoring the strategic processes of selecting and
building competencies, debating alternative courses of action, and undertaking
numerous exploratory initiatives that typically precede the eventual act of
organizational commitment and contribute significantly to improving the chances
that commitment may lead to success. For the purposes of understanding both the
content and processes of a competitive strategy, therefore, I would suggest that the
act of commitment can most usefully be viewed simply as the exercise of a strategic
option. As such, the important aspect of organizational commitment for strategy
theory is not the act of commitment itself but rather the prior efforts of strategic
managers and others in an organization to create a strategic option worthy of
commitment.
As for the supposed incompatibility of strategic flexibility with strategic
commitment, it should be apparent that a strategy based on strategic options can
only be of benefit to a firm if at least some of the options the firm works hard to
create are exercised. To suggest that a strategically flexible firm would dither in a
"netherworld of semicommitment" is to deny the fundamental objective of such a
strategy — which is to create the most advantageous possible set of opportunities
(i.e., options) for the firm to take action now and in the future. Furthermore, decisive
commitment to a course of action is more likely to be sensible (and successful) when
it is part of a strategy of keeping your options open -- i.e., not making commitments
— until you are as sure as you can be that making a commitment is the most
advantageous course of action available to the firm.
Without doubt, a well-considered act of commitment may provide clarity of
purpose that can focus an organization's efforts and may even motivate a higher than
usual level of effort by individuals within the organization who understand and
agree with the objectives committed to. In many cases, it may also be sensible to
make a "high commitment" to an ambitious goal as well, since to set an
organization's sights too low may cause the firm to miss many potential options for
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growth and development that it might otherwise discover in the future. Thus, "high
commitments" may help a firm achieve the strategic "stretch" (Prahalad and Hamel
1993) that helps a firm move beyond its present capabilities. Beyond these
considerations, however, to ascribe to commitment the power to assure some
measure of success to a firm that makes resource commitments that cannot be
justified by any rational analysis, is to impute some quasi-magical power to
commitment per se, which may in turn result in a failure to investigate adequately
the strategic processes that created the option to make a commitment and improved
the chances that exercise of the option (i.e., commitment) would result in success.
Another look at Sony should illustrate these points. Sony has often been
characterized as "a model of a classic high-commitment, internal-capability
company" (Bartlett 1993, p.297). I would suggest that for the purpose of gaining
insight into Sony's competitive strategy, such characterizations are incomplete and,
taken alone, are inadequate to explain Sony's impressive competitive successes in
highly dynamic markets. If one looks beyond the many highly visible commitments
which Sony has made and investigates more closely Sony's use of its impressive —
but tightly focussed — internal capabilities, I believe one can in fact observe the
workings of a consummate practitioner of options-driven strategic management. As
cases in point, consider the following alternative interpretations of two examples of
product development by Sony that are often characterized as "high commitments"
demanding "massive resource commitments for specific product developments
well in advance of market development" (Bartlett 1993, p.297).
In the 1980s, Sony succeeded in creating a new consumer product market with its
introduction and marketing of the Sony Walkman. Sony's development of the
Walkman (see Sanderson and Uzumeri 1989) is illustrative of Sony's options-driven
strategic management in the 1980s and beyond. Although product development was
driven forward by a small multifunctional team highly committed to transforming a
challenging new product concept into a real product, the strategy which Sony
pursued in developing the Walkman (as in other Sony products in the 1980s and
1990s [Sanchez 1991]) created a large set of product model options that Sony was
able to exercise at relatively low cost. Analysis of the engineering design of the
Walkman models suggests that Sony radically lowered the total cost of developing
and producing a large number of Walkman models by making extensive use of
existing "off-the-shelf" components readily available from Sony suppliers, by using
engineering skills in system design to proliferate a variety of models from a few
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"platform" designs, and by focussing Sony's own internal development efforts on a
key technologies and components (like thin circuit boards) which promised to
create options for extensive variations on the new product concept and for
improved models in the future.
By radically lowering the overall cost of developing and producing a large
number of new product variations, Sony created a large number of product options
which it could test at low cost by directly offering small lots of actual products to
the market — a practice which Sanchez and Sudharshan (1992) have termed
"real-time market research." Although Sony would no doubt like its competitors to
believe that producing many models of an unproven new product concept must
involve massive resource commitments in advance of market development, an
alternative view derived from analysis of Sony's technological capabilities,
engineering designs, and product family structure suggests that Sony has effectively
pursued a strategy of developing key technologies and engineering skills that
enable Sony to create a wide range of new product options at low total cost of
development and production.
From this perspective, the key strategic act by Sony's managers in product
development, therefore, does not appear to be an act of high commitment to
expensive new product development in advance of market development. Rather, the
key strategic acts appear to be (1) the insight by Sony's strategic managers that a
great number of consumer electronics product options could be created at low cost
by combining some key technological capabilities and product engineering skills
with a product design regime explicitly focussed on yielding a large number of new
product options, and (2) the creation by Sony management of those product options
by developing those key technological and engineering capabilities within the Sony
organization. Following these acts of strategic management, the act of commiting to
develop a new product like the Walkman can be viewed as an almost anti-climatic
exercise of one option among the many strategic options consequently available to
Sony.
Finally, consider the current "high-commitment" move by Sony to introduce a
recordable digital audio format — the Sony mini-disc, or "MD" — for consumer use,
which it hopes will become the de facto industry standard for consumer digital
recording and playing devices in the 1990s. The rewards to success in this effort will
probably be among the richest available in the consumer electronics industry in the
1990s. While Sony is no doubt therefore committed to succeeding in making MD the
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preferred format for personal digital recording if it possibly can, Sony has also
prudently (and quietly) cross-licensed its MD technology to arch-rival Philips
Consumer Electronics of the Netherlands in return for access to Philips' competing
digital compact cassette (DCC) technology. This cross-licensing agreement, of
course, gives Sony the option to switch technologies in the event that Philips beats
out Sony and succeeds in making DCC the industry standard format for digital
recording.
One wonders in this case whether the front line staff charged with developing
and promoting Sony's MD products — who have no doubt been asked by Sony to
commit to doing everything they possibly can to make MD the dominant digital
recording format in the 1990s — are actually demotivated by Sony's cross-licensing
agreement for Philips' DCC technology. I would speculate that the front lines of
Sony are not demotivated at all, but (like Sony's strategic managers) are realists who
understand that if Sony's MD technology should fail in spite of their best efforts,
Sony's strategic option to convert to Philips' DCC technology assures Sony's
managers and staff both of organizational continuity and of essentially a sure chance
to participate in the personal digital recording product markets of the 1990s.
In sum, then, examples of commitment followed by success usually make
inspirational stories, but they do not constitute a sufficient basis for improving our
understanding of competitive strategy. If there is a theory of strategy that can be
extracted from the commitment stories, it resides in the preceding work of strategic
managers who created a strategic option worthy of commitment, not in the eventual
act of commitment itself.
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